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Abstract
In this work, we initiate a formal study of probably approximately correct (PAC)
learning under evasion attacks, where the adversary’s goal is to misclassify the
adversarially perturbed sample point x˜, i.e., h(x˜) 6= c(x˜), where c is the ground
truth concept and h is the learned hypothesis. Previous work on PAC learning of
adversarial examples have all modeled adversarial examples as corrupted inputs in
which the goal of the adversary is to achieve h(x˜) 6= c(x), where x is the original
untampered instance. These two definitions of adversarial risk coincide for many
natural distributions, such as images, but are incomparable in general.
We first prove that for many theoretically natural input spaces of high dimension n
(e.g., isotropic Gaussian in dimension n under ℓ2 perturbations), if the adversary
is allowed to apply up to a sublinear o(‖x‖) amount of perturbations on the test
instances, PAC learning requires sample complexity that is exponential in n. This
is in contrast with results proved using the corrupted-input framework, in which
the sample complexity of robust learning is only polynomially more.
We then formalize hybrid attacks in which the evasion attack is preceded by a
poisoning attack. This is perhaps reminiscent of “trapdoor attacks” in which a
poisoning phase is involved as well, but the evasion phase here uses the error-
region definition of risk that aims at misclassifying the perturbed instances. In
this case, we show PAC learning is sometimes impossible all together, even when
it is possible without the attack (e.g., due to the bounded VC dimension).
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1 Introduction
Learning predictors is the task of outputting a hypothesis h using a training set S in such a way
that h can predict the correct label c(x) of unseen instances such as x with high probability. A
normal successful learner, however, could be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. In particular,
it was shown (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015) that deep neural
nets (DNNs) are vulnerable to so called adversarial examples that are the result of small (even
imperceptible to human eyes) perturbations on the original input x. Since the introduction of such
attacks, many works have studied defenses against them and more attacks are introduced afterwards
(Biggio et al., 2013, 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Xu et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2017).
A fundamental question in robust learning is whether one can design learning algorithms that achieve
“generalization” even under such adversarial perturbations. Namely, we want to know when we
can learn a robust classifier h that still correctly classifies its inputs even if they are adversarially
perturbed in a limited way. Indeed, one can ask when the (ε, δ) PAC (probably approximately
correct) learning (Valiant, 1984) is possible in adversarial settings. More formally, the goal here is to
learn a robust h from the data set S consisting ofm independently sampled labeled (non-adversarial)
instances in such a way that, with probability 1 − δ over the learning process, the produced h has
error at most ε even under “limited” adversarial perturbations of the input. This limitation is carefully
defined by some metric d defined over the input space X and some upper bound “budget” b on the
amount of perturbations that the adversary can introduce. I.e., we would like to minimize
AdvRisk(h) = Pr
x←D
[∃ x˜ : d(x, x˜) ≤ b, h(x˜) 6= c(x˜)] ≤ ε
where AdvRisk is the “adversarial” risk, and c(·) is the ground truth (i.e., the concept function).
Error-region adversarial risk. The above notion of adversarial risk has been used implicitly
or explicitly in previous work (Gilmer et al., 2018; Diochnos et al., 2018; Bubeck et al., 2018a;
Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan, 2019; Ford et al., 2019) and was formalized by Diochnos et al. (2018)
as the “error-region” adversarial risk, because adversary’s goal here is to push x˜ into the error region
E = {x | h(x) 6= c(x)} .
Corrupted-input adversarial risk. Another notion of adversarial risk (that is similar, but still
different from the error-region adversarial risk explained above) has been used in many works such
as (Feige et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017) in which the perturbed x˜ is interpreted as a “corrupted
input”. Namely, here the goal of the learner is to find the label of the original untampered point x
by only having its corrupted version x˜, and thus adversary’s success criterion is to reach d(x, x˜) ≤
b, h(x˜) 6= c(x). Hence, in that setting, the goal of the learner is to find an h that minimizes
Pr
x←D
[∃ x˜ : d(x, x˜) ≤ b, h(x˜) 6= c(x)].
It is easy to see that, if the ground truth c(x) does not change under b-perturbations, c(x) = c(x˜),
the two notions of error-region and corrupted-input adversarial risk will be equal. In particular,
this is the case for practical distributions of interest, such as images or voice, where sufficiently-
small perturbations usually do not change human’s judgment about the true label. However, if
b-perturbations can change the ground truth, c(x) 6= c(x˜), the two definitions are incomparable.
Several works have already studied PAC learning with provable guarantees under adversarial
perturbations (Bubeck et al., 2018b; Cullina et al., 2018; Feige et al., 2018; Attias et al., 2018;
Khim & Loh, 2018; Yin et al., 2018; Montasser et al., 2019). However, all these works use the
corrupted-input notion of adversarial risk. In particular, it is proved by Attias et al. (2018) that
robust learning might require more data, but it was also shown by Attias et al. (2018); Bubeck et al.
(2018b) that in natural settings, if robust classification is feasible, robust classifiers could be found
with a sample complexity that is only polynomially larger than that of normal learning. This leads
us to the our central question:
What problems are PAC learnable under evasion attacks that perturb instances
into the error region? If PAC learnable, what is their sample complexity?
2
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work, we initiate a formal study of PAC learning under adversarial perturbations, where the
goal of the adversary is to increase the error-region adversarial risk using small (sublinear o(‖x‖))
perturbations of the inputs x. Therefore, in what follows, whenever we refer to adversarial risk, by
default it means the error-region variant.
Result 1: exponential lower bound on sample complexity. Suppose the instances of a learning
problem come from a metric probability space (X , D, d) whereD is a distribution and d is a metric
defining some norm ‖·‖. Suppose the input instances have norms ‖x‖ ≈ n where n is a parameter
related (or in fact equal) to the data dimension. One natural setting of study for PAC learning is to
study attackers that can only perturb x by a sublinear amount o(‖x‖) = o(n) (e.g.,√n).
Our first result is to prove a strong lower bound for the sample complexity of PAC learning in
this setting. We prove that for many theoretically natural input spaces of high dimension n (e.g.,
isotropic Gaussian in dimension n under ℓ2 perturbations), PAC learning of certain problems under
sublinear perturbations of the test instances requires exponentially many samples in n, even though
the problem in the no-attack setting is PAC learnable using polynomially many samples. This holds
e.g., when we want to learn half spaces in dimension n under such distributions (which is possible in
the no-attack setting). We note that even though PAC learning is defined for all distributions, proving
such lower bound for a specific input distributionD over X only makes the negative result stronger.
Our lower bound is in contrast with previously proved results (Attias et al., 2018; Bubeck et al.,
2018b; Montasser et al., 2019; Cullina et al., 2018) in which the gap between the sample complexity
of the normal and robust learning is only polynomial. However, as mentioned before, all these
previous results are proved using the corrupted-input variant of adversarial risk.
Our result extends to any learning problem where input space X , the metric d and the distribution
D defined over them, and the class of concept functions C have the following two conditions.
1. The inputs X under the distribution D and small perturbations measured by the metric
d forms a concentrated metric probability space (Ledoux, 2001; Milman & Schechtman,
1986). A concentrated space has the property that relatively small events (e.g., of measure
0.1) under small (e.g., smaller than the diameter of the space) perturbations expand to cover
almost all measure≈ 1 of the input space.
2. The set of concept functions C are complex enough to allow proving lower bounds for the
sample complexity for (distribution-dependent) PAC learners in the no-attack setting un-
der the same distribution D. Distribution-dependent sample complexity lower bounds are
known for certain settings (Long, 1995; Balcan & Long, 2013; Sabato et al., 2013), how-
ever, we use a more relaxed condition that can be applied to broader settings. In particular,
we require that for a sufficiently small ε, there are two concept functions c1, c2 that are
equal for 1− ε fraction of inputs sampled fromD (see Definition 3.3).
Having the above two conditions, our proof proceeds as follows (I) We show that the (normal) risk
Risk(h) of a hypothesis produced by any learning algorithmwith sub-exponential sample complexity
cannot be as large as an inverse polynomial over the dimension. (II) We then use ideas from the
works (e.g., see (Mahloujifar et al., 2018b)) to show that such sufficiently large risk will expand into
a large adversarial risk of almost all inputs, due to the measure concentration the input space.
Remark 1.1 (Approximation error in error-region robust learning). If a learning problem is realiz-
able in the no-attack setting, i.e., there is a hypothesis h that has risk zero over the test instances, it
means that the same hypothesis h will have adversarial (true) risk zero over the test instances as well,
because any perturbed point is still going to be correctly classified. This is in contrast with corrupted-
input notion of adversarial risk that even in realizable problems, the smallest corrupted-input (true)
adversarial risk could still be large, and even at odds with correctness (Tsipras et al., 2018). This
means that our results rule out (efficient) PAC learning even in the agnostic setting as well, because
in the realizable setting there is at least one hypothesis with error-region adversarial risk zero while
(as we prove), in some settings learning a model with adversarial risk (under sublinear perturbations)
close to zero requires exponentially many samples.
Result 2: ruling out PAC learning under hybrid attacks. We then study PAC learning under
adversarial perturbations that happen during both training and testing phases. We formalize hy-
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brid attacks in which the final evasion attack is preceded by a poisoning attack (Biggio et al., 2012;
Papernot et al., 2016a). This attack model bears similarities to “trapdoor attacks” (Gu et al., 2017) in
which a poisoning phase is involved before the evasion attack, and here we give a formal definition
for PAC learning under such attacks. Our definition of hybrid attacks is general and can incorporate
any notion of adversarial risk, but our results for hybrid attacks use the error-region adversarial risk.
Under hybrid attacks, we show that PAC learning is sometimes impossible all together, even though
it is possible without such attacks. For example, even if the VC dimension of the concept class is
bounded by n, if the adversary is allowed to poison only 1/n10 fraction of them training examples,
then it can do so in such a way that a subsequent evasion attack could then increase the adversarial
risk to ≈ 1. This means that PAC learning is in fact impossible under such hybrid attacks.
We also note that classical results about malicious noise (Valiant, 1985; Kearns & Li, 1993) and
nasty noise (Bshouty et al., 2002) could be interpreted as ruling out PAC learning under poisoning
attacks. However, there are two differences: (I) The adversary in these previous works needs to
change a constant fraction of the training examples, while our attacker changes only an arbitrarily
small inverse polynomial fraction of them. (II)Our poisoning attacker only removes a fraction of the
training set, and hence it does not add any misclassified examples to the pool. Thus the poisoning
attack used here is a clean/correct label attack (Mahloujifar et al., 2018a; Shafahi et al., 2018).
2 Defining Adversarially Robust PAC Learning
Notation. By O˜(f(n)) we refer to the set of all functions of the form O(f(n) log(f(n))O(1)).
We use capital calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for sets and capital non-calligraphic letters (e.g., D) for
distributions. x← D denotes sampling x fromD. For an event S, we letD(S) = Prx←D[x ∈ S].
A classification problem P = (X ,Y, C,D,H) is specified by the following components. The set
X is the set of possible instances, Y is the set of possible labels, D is a class of distributions over
instances X . In the standard setting of PAC learning, D includes all distributions, but since we
deal with negative results, we sometimes work with fixed D = {D} distributions, and show that
even distribution-dependent robust PAC learning is sometimes hard. In that case, we represent the
problem as P = (X ,Y, C, D,H). The set C ⊆ YX is the concept class and H ⊆ YX is the
hypothesis class. In general, we can allow randomized concept and hypothesis functions to model,
in order, label uncertainly (usually modeled by a joint distribution over instances and labels) and
randomized predictions. All of our results extend to randomized learners and randomized hypothesis
functions, but for simplicity of presentation, we treat them as deterministic mappings. By default,
we consider 0-1 loss functions where ℓoss(y′, y) = 1[y′ = y]. For a given distributionD ∈ D and
a concept function c ∈ C, the risk of a hypothesis h ∈ H is the expected loss of h with respect to
D, namely Risk(D, c, h) = Prx←D[ℓoss(h(x), c(x))]. An example z is a pair z = (x, y) where
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . An example is usually sampled by first sampling x ← D for some D ∈ D
followed by letting y = c(x) for some c ∈ C. A sample sequence S = (z1, . . . , zm) is a sequence
ofm examples. As is usual, sometimes we might refer to a sample sequence as the training set. By
S ← (D, c(D))m we denote the process of obtaining S by sampling m iid samples from D and
labeling them by c.
Our learning problemsPn = (Xn,Yn, Cn,Dn,Hn) are usually parameterized by nwhere n denotes
the “data dimension” or (closely) capture the bit length of the instances. Thus, the “efficiency” of
the algorithms could depend on n. Even in this case, for simplicity of notation, we might simply
write P = (X ,Y, C,D,H). By default, we will have C ⊆ H, in which case we call P realizable.
This means that for any training set for c ∈ C, D ∈ D, there is a hypothesis that has empirical and
true risk zero; though finding such h might be challenging.
Evasion attacks. An evasion attacker A is one that changes the test instance x, denoted as x˜ ←
A(x). The behavior and actions taken byA could, in general, depend on the choices ofD ∈ D, c ∈ C,
and h ∈ H. As a result, in our notation, we provideAwith access toD, c, h by giving them as special
inputs to A,3 denoting the process as x˜ ← A[D, c, h](x). We use calligraphic font A to denote a
class/set of attacks. For example,A could contain all attackers who could change test instance x by
at most b perturbations under a metric defined over X .
3This dependence is information theoretic, and for example, A might want to find x˜ that is misclassified, in
which case its success is defined as h(x˜) 6= c(x˜) which depends on both h, c.
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Poisoning attacks. A poisoning attackerA is one that changes the training sequence as S˜ ← A(S).
Such attacks, in general, might add examples to S, remove examples from S, or do both. The
behavior and actions taken by A could, in general, depend on the choices of D ∈ D, c ∈ C (but not
on h ∈ H, as it is not produced by the learner at the time of the poisoning attack)4. As a result,
we provide implicit access to D, c by giving them as special inputs to A, denoting the process as
S˜ ← A[D, c](S). We use calligraphic font A to denote a class/set of attacks. For example,A could
contain attacks that change 1/n fraction of S only using clean labels (Mahloujifar et al., 2018b;
Shafahi et al., 2018).
Hybrid attacks. A hybrid attack A = (A1,A2) is a two phase attack in which A1 is a poisoning
attacker andA2 is an evasion attacker. One subtle point is that A2 is also aware of the internal state of
A1, as they are a pair of coordinating attacks. More formally,A1 outputs an extra “state” information
st which will be given as an extra input to A2. As discussed above, A1 can depend on D, c, and A2
can depend onD, c, h as defined for evasion and poisoning attacks.
We now define PAC learning under adversarial perturbation attacks. To do so, we need to first define
our notion of adversarial risk. We will do so by employing the error-region notion adversarial risk
as formalized in Diochnos et al. (2018) adversary aims to misclassify the perturbed instance x˜.
Definition 2.1 (Error-region (adversarial) risk). Suppose A is an evasion adversary and let D, c, h
be fixed. The error-region (adversarial) risk is defined as follows.
AdvRiskA(D, c, h) = Pr
x←D,x˜←A[D,c,h](x)
[h(x˜) 6= c(x˜)].
For randomized h, the above probability is also over the randomness of h chosen after x˜ is selected.
We now define PAC learning under hybrid attacks, from which one can derive also the definition of
PAC learning under evasion attacks and under poisoning attacks.
Definition 2.2 (PAC learning under hybrid attacks). Suppose Pn = (Xn,Yn, Cn,Dn,Hn) is a real-
izable classification problem, and supposeA is a class of hybrid attacks for Pn. Pn is PAC learnable
with sample complexitym(ε, δ, n) under hybrid attacks ofA , if there is a learning algorithm L such
that for every n, 0 < ε, δ < 1, c ∈ C, D ∈ D, and (A1,A2) ∈ A, ifm = m(ε, δ, n), then
Pr
S←(D,c(D))m,
(S˜,st)←A1[D,c](S),
h←L(S˜)
[
AdvRiskA2[D,c,h,st](h, c,D) > ε
] ≤ δ.
PAC learning under (pure) poisoning attacks or evasion attacks could be derived from Definition 2.2
by letting either of A1 or A2 be a trivial attack that does no tampering at all.
We also note that one can obtain other definitions of PAC learning under evasion or hybrid at-
tacks in Definition 2.2 by using other forms of adversarial risk, e.g., corrupted-input adversarial
risk (Feige et al., 2015, 2018; Madry et al., 2017; Schmidt et al., 2018; Attias et al., 2018)
3 Lower Bounds for PAC Learning under Evasion and Hybrid Attacks
Before proving our main results, we need to recall the notion of Normal Lévy families, and define a
desired and common property of set of concept functions with respect to the distribution of inputs.
Notation. Let (X , d) be a metric space. For S ⊆ X , by d(x,S) = inf {d(x, y) | y ∈ S}we denote
the distance of a point x from S. We also let Sb = {y | d(x, y) ≤ b, x ∈ S} be the b-expansion of
S. When there is also a measureD defined over the metric space (X , d), the concentration function
is defined and denoted as α(b) = 1− inf {PrD[Eb] | PrD[E ] ≥ 1/2} .
Definition 3.1 (Normal Lévy families). A family of metric probability spaces (Xn, dn, Dn)i∈N with
concentration function αn(·) is called a normal Lévy family if there are k1, k2, such that5
αn(b) ≤ k1 · e−k2·b
2/n
4For example, an attack model might require A to choose its perturbed instances still using correct/clean
labels, in which case the attack is restricted based on the choice of c).
5Another common formulation of Normal Lévy families uses αn(b) ≤ k1 · e
−k2·b
2·n, but here we scale the
distances up by n to achieve “typical norms” to be ≈ n, which is the dimension.
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Examples. Many natural metric probability spaces are Normal Lévy families. For example, all the
following examples under normalized distance (to make the typical norms ≈ n) are normal Lévy
families as stated in Definition 3.1: the unit n-sphere with uniform distribution under the Euclidean
or geodesic distance, Rn under Gaussian distribution and Euclidean distance, Rn under Gaussian
distribution and Euclidean distance, the unit n-cube and unit n-ball under the uniform distribution
and Euclidean distance, any product distribution of dimension n under the Hamming distance. See
(Ledoux, 2001; Giannopoulos & Milman, 2001; Milman & Schechtman, 1986) for more examples.
The following lemma was proved in Mahloujifar et al. (2018b) when Normal Lévy input spaces.
Lemma 3.2. Let the input space of a hypothesis classifier h be a Normal Lévy family
(Xn, dn, Dn)i∈N. If the risk of h with respect to the ground truth concept function c is bigger than
α, Risk(Dn, c, h) ≥ α, and if an adversary A can perturb instances by up to b in metric dn for
b =
√
n/k2 ·
(√
ln(k1/α) +
√
ln(k1/β)
)
,
then the adversarial risk is AdvRiskA(D,h, c) ≥ 1− β.
Definition 3.3 (α-close function families). SupposeD is a distribution over X , and let C be a set of
functions from X to some set Y . We call C α-close with respect to D, if there are c1, c2 ∈ C such
that Prx←D[c1(x) 6= c2(x)] = α.
Examples. The set of homogeneous half spaces in Rn are α-close for all α ∈ (0, 1] under any of
the following natural distributions: uniform over the unit sphere, uniform inside the unit ball, and
isotropic Gaussian. This can be proved by picking two half spaces that their disagreement region
under the mentioned distributions is exactly α. The set of (monotone, or not necessarily monotone)
conjunctions are α-close for α = 2−k for all k ∈ {2, . . . , n} under the uniform distribution over
{0, 1}n. This can be proved by looking at c1 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xk−1 and c2 = x1 ∧ . . . ∧ xk−1 ∧ xk =
c1∧xk . Since all the variables that appear in c1 also appear in c2, we have that Prx←{0,1}n [c1(x) 6=
c2(x)] is equal to Prx←{0,1}n [(c1(x) = 1) ∧ (c2(x) = 0)], and as a consequence this is equal to
2−(k−1) − 2−k = 2−k.
We now state and prove our main results. Theorem 3.4 is stated in the asymptotic form considering
attack families that attack the problem for sufficiently large index n ∈ N of the problem. We describe
a quantitative variant afterwards (Lemma 3.5).
Theorem 3.4 (Limits of adversarially robust PAC learning). Suppose Pn = (X ,Y, C,D,H) is a
realizable classification problem and that X is a Normal Lévy Family (Definition 3.1) over D and
a metric d, and that C is Θ(α)-close with respect to D for all α ∈ [2−Θ(n), 1]. Then, the following
hold even for PAC learning with parameters ε = 0.9, δ = 0.49.
1. Sample complexity of PAC learning robust fo evasion attacks:
(a) Exponential lower bound: Any PAC learning algorithm that is robust against all
attacks with a sublinear tampering b = o(n) budget under the metric d requires expo-
nential sample complexitym ≥ 2Ω(n).
(b) Super-polynomial lower bound: PAC learning that is robust against against all tam-
pering attacks with budget b = O˜(
√
n), requires at leastm ≥ nω(1) many samples.
2. Ruling out PAC learning robust to hybrid attacks:
Suppose the tampering budget of the evasion adversary can be any b = O˜(
√
n), and let
Bλ be any class of poisoning attacks that can remove λ = λ(n) fraction of the training
examples for an (arbitrary small) inverse polynomial λ(n) ≥ 1/ poly(n). Let R be the
class of hybrid attacks that first do a poisoning by some B ∈ Bλ and then an evasion
by some adversary of budget b = O˜(
√
n). Then, Pn is not PAC learnable (regardless of
sample complexity) under hybrid attacks in R.
As we will see, Part 1a and Part 1b of Theorem 3.4 are special cases of the following more quantita-
tive lower bound that might be of independent interest.
Lemma 3.5. For the setting of Theorem 3.4, if the tampering budget is b = ρ ·n, for a fixed function
ρ = ρ(n) = o(1), then any PAC learning algorithm for Pn under evasion attacks of tampering
budget b = b(n), even for parameters ε = 0.9, δ = 0.49 requires sample complexity at least
m(n) ≥ 2Ω(ρ2·n).
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Examples. Here we list some natural scenarios that fall into the conditions of Theorem 3.4. All
examples of Normal Lévy families listed after Definition 3.1 together with the concept class of half
spaces satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.4 and hence cannot be PAC learned using a poly(n) num-
ber of samples. The reason is that one can always find two half spaces whose symmetric difference
has measure exactly ε. Moreover, as discussed in examples following Definition 3.3, even discrete
problems such as learning monotone-conjunctions under the uniform distribution (and Hamming
distance as perturbation metric) fall into the conditions of Theorem 3.4, for which a lower bound on
their sample complexity (or even impossibility) of robust PAC learning could be obtained.
Remark 3.6 (Evasion-robust PAC learning in the RAM computing model with real numbers). We
remark that if we allow (truly) real numbers represent the concept and hypothesis classes, one can
even rule out PAC learning (not just lower bounds on sample complexity) under similar perturba-
tions describe in Part 1. Indeed, by inspecting the same proof of Theorem 3.4 for Part 1 one can get
such results, e.g., for learning half-spaces in dimension nwhen inputs come from isotropic Gaussian.
However, we emphasize that such (seemingly) stronger lower bounds are not realistic, as in real set-
tings, we eventually work with finite precision to represent the concept functions (of half spaces).
This makes the set of concept functions finite, in which case the test error eventually reaches zero,
using perhaps exponentially many samples. Theorem 3.4, however, has the useful feature that it ap-
plies even in those settings, as long as the concept functions are rich enough to allow the sufficiently
close (but not too close) pairs under the distributionD according to Definition 3.3.
In what follows, we will first prove Lemma 3.5. We will then use Lemma 3.5 to prove Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Let m = m(0.9, 0.49, n) be the sample complexity of the (presumed) learner
L that achieves (ε, δ)-PAC learning for ε = 0.9, δ = 0.49. Ifm = 2Ω(n) already, we are done, as it is
even larger than what Lemma 3.5 states, so letm = 2o(n), and we will derive a contradiction. Since
the distributionD is fixed, in the discussion below, we simply denote Risk(D,h, c) as Risk(h, c).
Recall that, by assumption, for all ε ∈ [2−Θ(n), 1], there are c1, c2 ∈ C that are Θ(ε)-close under
the distributionD. Becausem = 2o(n), it holds that 1/m ≥ ω(2−Θ(n)), and so there are c1, c2 ∈ C
such that for∆(c1, c2) = {x ∈ X | c1(x) 6= c2(x)} we have
Ω
(
1
m
)
≤ Pr
x←D
[x ∈ ∆(c1, c2)] ≤ 1
100m
.
Now, consider m i.i.d. samples that are given to the learner L as a training set S. With probability
at least 0.99 of the sampling of S, all x ∈ S would be outside ∆(c1, c2), in which case L would
have no way to distinguish c1 from c2. So, if we pick c← {c1, c2} at random and pick test instance
x← (D | ∆(c1, c2)), the hypothesis h = L(S) fails with probability at least 0.99/2. Thus, we can
fix the choice of c ∈ {c1, c2}, such that with probability 0.99/2 > 0.49 we get a h← L(S) where
Risk(h, c) = Pr
x←D
[h(x) 6= c(x)] ≥ 1
2
· Pr
x←D
[x ∈ ∆(c1, c2)] ≥ Ω
(
1
m
)
.
For this fixed c and any such learned hypothesis h with Risk(h, c) = Ω(1)/m, by Lemma 3.2, the
adversarial risk reaches AdvRiskAb(h, c) ≥ 0.99 by an attack A ∈ Ab that has tampering budget:
b = O(
√
n) · (√ln(O(m)) +√O(1)) ≤ t · (√n · lnm)
for universal constant t. But, we said at the beginning that the tampering budget of the adversary is
ρ(n) · n. Therefore, it should be that
ρ(n) · n < t · (
√
n · lnm),
as otherwise the evasion-robust PAC learner is not actually robust as stated. Thus, we get
m ≥ eρ(n)2·n/t = 2Ω(ρ(n)2·n)
which finishes the proof of Lemma 3.5.
We now prove Theorem 3.4 using Lemma 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Using Lemma 3.5, we will first prove Part 1a, then Part 1b, and then Part 2.
Throughout, ε = 0.9, δ = 0.49 are fixed, so the sample complexitym = m(n) is a function of n.
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Proving Part 1a. We claim that PAC learning resisting all b = o(n)-tampering attacks requires
sample complexitym ≥ 2Ω(n). The reason is that, otherwise, there will be an infinite sequence of
values n1 < n2 < . . . for n for whichm = m(ni) ≤ 2γ(ni)·(ni) for γ(n) = o(1). However, in that
case, if we let ρ(n) = γ(n)1/3, because ρ(n) = o(n), by Lemma 3.5, the sample complexity is
m(ni) ≥ 2Ω(ρ(ni)
2·ni) = ω
(
2γ(ni)·ni
)
.
However, this is a contradiction as we previously assumedm(ni) ≤ 2γ(ni)·(ni).
Proving Part 1b. Suppose the adversary can tamper instances with budget b(n) = κ(n) · √n for
κ(n) ∈ polylog(n). Since we can rewrite b(n) = ρ(n)·n for ρ(n) = κ(n)/√n, then by Lemma 3.5,
the sample complexity of L should be at least
m(n) ≥ 2Ω(ρ(n)2·n) = 2Ω(κ(n)2).
Therefore, if we choose κ(n) = log(n)2, the sample complexity of L becomesm ≥ nlogn ≥ nω(1).
Proving Part 2. Let be c1, c2 ∈ C be such that for∆(c1, c2) = {x ∈ X | c1(x) 6= c2(x)} we have
Ω(λ) ≤ Pr
x←D(c1,c2)
[x ∈ ∆(c1, c2)] ≤ λ.
Consider a poisoning attacker A1 that given a data set S, it removes any (x, y) from S such that
x ∈ ∆(c1, c2). Note that the (expected) number of such examples is Pr[x ∈ ∆(c1, c2)] ≤ λ. Let S˜
be the modified training set. The learner L(S˜) now has now way to distinguish between c1 and c2.
Thus, like in Lemma 3.5, we can fix c ∈ {c1, c2}, such that L(S˜) always produces h where
Risk(h, c) = Pr
x←D
[h(x) 6= c(x)] ≥ 1
2
· Pr
x←D
[x ∈ ∆(c1, c2)] ≥ Ω(λ).
For this fixed c and any such learned hypothesis h with Risk(h, c) = Ω(λ), by Lemma 3.2, the
adversarial risk (under attacks) reaches AdvRiskAb(h, c) ≥ 0.99 by an attack A ∈ Ab that changes
test instances x by at most b for
b = O(
√
n) · (√ln(O(1/λ)) +√O(1)) ≤ O(√n · ln(1/λ)).
Since λ = 1/ poly(n), it holds that b = O˜(
√
n).
4 Extensions
In this section, we describe some extensions to Theorem 3.4 in various directions.
Extension to randomized predictors. In Theorem 3.4, we ruled out PAC learning (or its small
sample complexity) even for very large values ε = 0.9, δ = 0.49. One might argue that proving such
lower bound could not be impossible because a trivial hypothesis (for the setting where Y = {0, 1})
can achieve ε = 0.5 by outputting random bits. However, this trivial predictor is randomized, while
Theorem 3.4 is proved for deterministic hypotheses. For the case of randomized hypotheses, one
can adjust the proof of Theorem 3.4 to get similar lower bounds for ε = 0.49, δ = 0.49 as follows.
In the proof of Theorem 3.4 we first showed that small sample complexity implies the existence of
c that with probability > 0.49 it will have an error region with a non-negligible measure. When
the hypothesis is randomized, however, we cannot work with the traditional notion of error region,
because on every point x ∈ X , the hypothesis could be wrong h(x) 6= c(x) with some probability
in [0, 1]. We can, however, work with the relaxed notion of “approximate error” region, defined as
AE(h, c) = {x | Prh[h(x) 6= c(x)] ≥ 1/2}, where the probability is over the randomness of h.
In proofs of both Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.4 we deal with two close concept functions c1, c2 that
are “indistinguishable” for the hypothesis h and then conclude that for each point x ∈ ∆(c1, c2),
h makes a mistake on at least one of c1, c2. If h is randomized, we cannot say this anymore, but
we can still say that for each such point x ∈ ∆(c1, c2), for at least one of c1, c2, h(x) is wrong
with probability at least 0.5. Therefore, we get the same lower bound on the size of the AE as we
got in Lemma 3.5 and Theorem 3.4. However, expanding the set AE instead of an actual error-
region, implies that the adversarially perturbed points x˜ that fall intoAE are now misclassified with
probability 0.5. Thus, at least 0.99 fraction of inputs can be perturbed into AE to be misclassified
with probability > 0.49.
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Lower bound for PAC learning of a “typical” concept function. Theorem 3.4 only proves the
existence of at least one concept function c ∈ C for which the (presumed) robust PAC learner will
either fail (to PAC learn) or will need large sample complexity. Now, suppose concept functions
themselves come from a (natural) distribution and we only want to robustly PAC learn most of them.
Indeed, we can extend the proof of Theorem 3.4 to show that for natural settings, the impossibility
result extends to at least half of the concept functions, not just a few pathological cases.
To extend Theorem 3.4 to the more general “typical” failure over c← C (stated as Claim 4.2 below)
we need the following definition as an extension to Definition 3.3.
Definition 4.1 (Uniformly α-close function families). SupposeD is a distribution overX , and let C
be a set of functions from X to some set Y . We call C uniformly α-close with respect to D, if there
is a joint distribution (c1, c2) where both coordinates are uniformly distributed over C, and that for
all (c1, c2) ← (c1, c2), it both holds that c1, c2 ∈ C and that Prx←D[c1(x) 6= c2(x)] = α.
Claim 4.2. In Theorem 3.4 and Lemma 3.5, make the only change in the setting as follows. The
concept class C now satisfies the stronger condition of being uniform α-close with respect to D.
Then, the same limitations of PAC learning hold for at least measure half of c← C.
Here we sketch why Claim 4.2 holds. The difference is that now, instead of knowing the existence
of an α-close pair (c1, c2), we have distribution (c1, c2) samples from which satisfy the α-close
property. Therefore, for all samples (c1, c2) ← (c1, c2), at least one of c1 or c2 is “bad” for the
(presumed) PAC learner L (with the same proof before). But, since each of the coordinates in
(c1, c2) is marginally uniform, therefore, at least measure 1/2 of c← C is bad for L.
Example. Consider the uniform measure over homogeneous half spaces in dimension n as the set
of concept functions C: choose a pointw in the unit sphere and select the half space {x | 〈x,w〉 ≥ 0}.
It is easy to see that C with such measure is uniformly α-close with respect to the isotropic Gaussian
distribution (or uniform distribution over the unit sphere). Thus, Claim 4.2 applies to this case.
5 Conclusion and Open Questions
We examined evasion attacks, where the adversary can perturb instances during test time, as well as
hybrid attacks where the adversary can perturb instances during both training and test time. For eva-
sion attacks we gave an exponential lower bound on the sample complexity even when the adversary
can perturb instances by an amount of o(n), where n is the data dimension capturing the “typical”
norm of an input. For hybrid attacks, PAC learning is ruled out altogether when the adversary can
poison a small fraction of the training examples and still perturb the test instance by a sublinear
amount o(n) (or even O˜(
√
n)).
Our result shows a different behavior when it comes to PAC learning for error-region adversarial risk
compared to previously used notions of adversarial robustness based on corrupted inputs. In particu-
lar, in the error-region variant of adversarial risk, realizable problems stay realizable, as normal risk
zero for a hypothesis h also implies (error-region) adversarial risk zero for the same h. This makes
our results more striking, as they apply to agnostic learning as well.
Open questions. Our Theorem 3.4 relies on a level of tampering to be at least O˜(
√
n) to imply the
super-polynomial lower bounds. One natural question is to find the exact threshold of perturbations
needed that triggers super-polynomial lower bounds on sample complexity.
Another important direction is to study the sample complexity of PAC learning (with concrete pa-
rameters ε, δ) for practical distributions such as images or voice. Our lower bounds of this work are
only proved for theoretically natural distributions that are provably concentrated in high dimension.
Mahloujifar et al. (2019), presents a method for empirically approximating the concentration of such
distributions given i.i.d. samples from them.
Finally, we ask if similar results could be proved for corrupted-input adversarial risk. Note
that previous work studying learning under corrupted-input adversarial risk (Bubeck et al., 2018b;
Cullina et al., 2018; Feige et al., 2018; Attias et al., 2018; Khim & Loh, 2018; Yin et al., 2018;
Montasser et al., 2019) focus on agnostic learning, by aiming to get close to the “best” robust classi-
fier. However, it is not clear how good the best classifier is. It remains open to find out when we can
learn robust classifiers (under corrupted-input risk) in which the total adversarial risk is small.
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